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Abstract
Since the global decline in commercial whaling, the International Whaling Commission
(iwc) has been at the centre of a long-standing debate between pro-whaling industry
States and whale preservation States that threatens the collapse of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IcRw) as a treaty regime. This article
describes the ongoing treaty regime disagreement that led to the International Court
of Justice (icy) Whaling in the Antarctic case and suggests that the ici's decision high-
lights further weaknesses in the existing ICRW treaty regime. The fissures in the treaty
regime have become even more apparent with the iwc Scientific Committee's request
for more data from the Japanese government on the Proposed Research Plan for
New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) and
Japan's diplomatic threat to unilaterally resume whaling. The article concludes with
a suggestion that States amend Article viII in order to strengthen the existing ICRW
framework.
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AFTER WHALING IN THE ANTARCTIC
Introduction
In the shadow of the 31 March 2014 International Court ofJustice (Ic) opinion
on Whaling in the Antarctic,' the International Whaling Commission (iwc),
created by the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW)
to adopt regulations "with respect to the conservation and utilization of whale
resources," faces yet another trying period.2 Although this is not the first crisis
of institutional legitimacy faced by the iwc, it raises deeper questions about
the sustainability of the iwc as the international body that is not only respon-
sible for imposing a commercial whaling moratorium, but that is also required
to "provide for the conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the
whale resources".3 When the Icj decided that the design and implementation
of Japan's Antarctic Research Program for whaling (JARPA II) was not "rea-
sonable in relation to achieving the programme's stated research objective",
the icj ended up assuming a gatekeeper role that should have been internally
managed within the ICRw regime.4
The first part of this article examines recurring fissures in the Icaiw regime
between States who wish to resume commercial whaling and States who are
committed to a moratorium. The second part explains how the recent cj
case and subsequent responses to the case by the iwc members highlight the
ongoing rifts within the ICRw regime. The third part offers brief comments
on how Article vinl of the ICRW may need to be amended or risk institutional
implosion.
Early Fissures in the ICRW Treaty Regime
In the 1930s and 1940s, it became clear to many States that whale populations
had been severely overharvested, in order to be processed into oil, soaps and
other household products, such as margarine, as well as being consumed
I Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New Zealand intervening) (31 March 2014).
Judgment, Declarations, Separate Opinions, and Dissenting Opinions available at http://
www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/48/18136.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015 [hereinafter 'Whaling in
the Antarctic'].
2 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, (Washington, o.c., 2 December
1946, in force io November 1948) 161 U.N. T.S. 72, Article v(i) [hereinafter 'ICRW'].
3 Ibid., at Article v(2).
4 Judgment (n. 1) at p. 65, para. 227.
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as meat.5 Yet the genesis of the ICRW regime as a management treaty was a
struggle. Key states opted out of early versions of regulatory whaling regimes
designed to restrain overharvesting. Even though Japan and the (then) USSR
were among the most active of the commercial whaling nations, neither
Japan nor the USSR ratified the first Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
negotiated in 1931 to protect right whales or the Second Convention for the
Regulation of Whaling negotiated in 1937 to protect gray whales.6
As whale stocks continued to decline, States eventually reached a coopera-
tive agreement in 1946 under the ICaw with membership from active whaling
nations, including Japan and the USSR. Yet the treaty regime lacked coop-
erative enforcement measures. Almost immediately after the treaty entered
into force, States failed to comply with quotas set by the iwC and in some
instances actively falsified their capture numbers.7 Patience with the incapac-
ity of the I C RW regime to respond effectively to global overharvesting was fray-
ing. In 1972, at the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
in Stockholm, the us requested a moratorium on all endangered whale spe-
cies in part because of the perceived mismanagement of whales under the
ICRw regime; the request received 53 supporting votes and 12 abstentions.8
5 J Hannewijk, 'Use of Fish Oils in Margarine and Shortening' in M.E. Stansby (ed.), Fish Oils
(Avi Publishing Company, Westport, 1967) 251-269, at p. 251. ("In Europe, Canada, Japan,
and other countries hardened whale oil has been used in margarine and edible fats for over
50 years".); PJ Clapham and CS Baker,'Whaling, Modem' in WF Perrin, BWursig, andJThewissen
(eds.), Encyclopedia ofMarineMammals (Academic Press, NewYork, 2002)1328-1332 (noting
that even by World War I many whalers had commercially exhausted their original target
species and were seeking new species in new hunting grounds).
6 L Kobayashi, 'Lifting the International Whaling Commission's Moratorium on Commercial
Whaling as the Most Effective Global Regulation of Whaling' (2006) 29(2) Environs:
Environmental Law & PolicyJournal 177-219, at pp. 180-7.
7 P Clapham, Y Mikhalev, W Franklin, D Paton, and CS Baker, "Catches of Humpback Whales,
Megaptera novaeangliae, by the Soviet Union and Other Nations in the Southern Ocean,
1947-1973" (2009) 71(1) Marine Fisheries Review, 39-43, at P. 40 (describing how the Soviet
Union in its Southern Hemisphere reports to the iwc claimed to take 2,71o humpback whales
but actually took 48,477 humpback whales).
8 United Nations, Report of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm, 5-16 June 1972, A/CONF.48/14/Rev.1 at p. 12, Recommendation 33 ("It is recom-
mended that Governments agree to strengthen the International Whaling Commission, to
increase international research efforts, and as a matter of urgency to call for an international
agreement, under the auspices of the International Whaling Commission and involving all
Governments concerned, for a 1o-year moratorium on commercial whaling".); ibid., at p. 56,
paras. 191-192 (relabeling recommendation 33 as recommendation 86 for purposes of voting
at the UN Convention on the Environment and Development). In response to the vote, Japan
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Subsequently, a number of whaling industry States, arguing that there was a
lack of scientific evidence to support a moratorium, blocked a vote in 1974 for
the iwc to impose a moratorium.9 For several of the I CRW's members, such as
the us, who were frustrated with the politics of the iwc, the iwo was regarded
as an institution captured by minority interests until 1982, when a 10-year
moratorium was adopted for all commercial whaling until additional studies
could be undertaken to determine at what level commercial whaling might be
sustainably revived. The moratorium vote reflected a new pattern of rift lines.10
The iwc, designed as an institution to protect the long-term interests of whal-
ing industry through the conservation of whale populations for harvest, had
gradually become "preservationist".n
After the moratorium, the protection of certain whale species and the cre-
ation of whale sanctuaries under the ICRW were both deemed necessary by
the majority of iwo parties to achieve global preservation objectives rather
than resource management measures. With a prohibition on all commercial
whaling in the Indian Ocean Sanctuary and the Southern Ocean Sanctuary,
whaling industry States are now at constant odds with whale preservation
"explained that while it was favourable to a moratorium on commercial whaling,
it had abstained in the vote because the whole question was to be considered by the
International Whaling Commission on the basis of available scientific information".
g International Commission on Whaling, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commission,
Appendix i, "International Whaling Commission Chairman's Report of the Twenty-
Fourth Meeting, Summary of Main Decisions Made at Meeting" (1974) 20-36, at pp. 24-25
(observing that a global moratorium was opposed by iwc's Technical Committee and
Scientific Committee with the justification that stocks should be managed individually,
and stating that the vote in the iwc plenary for a global moratorium was four delegations
in favor, six delegations opposed, and four delegations abstaining); ICRw (n. 1.) at Arti-
cle 111(2). (Votes to change the ICRW Schedule on whaling catch limits require a three-
quarter majority.)
1o The moratorium was decided by a 25 to 7 vote with 5 abstentions. Voting for the morato-
rium were Antigua, Australia, Belize, Costa Rica, Denmark, Egypt, France, Germany, India,
Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, Oman, St. Lucia, St. Vincent, Senegal, the Seychelles, Spain,
Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States. Voting against the moratorium were
Brazil, Iceland,Japan, Norway, Peru, South Korea, and the USSR. Abstaining from the vote
were Chile, China, the Philippines, South Africa, and Switzerland. International Whaling
Commission, 'Chairman's Report of the 34th Annual Meeting' (1983) 33 Report of the
International Whaling Commission 20-42, at p. 21. See generally PW Birnie, International
Regulation of Whaling (Oceana Publications, Dobbs Ferry, NY, 1985).
11 HM Babcock, 'Why Changing Norms is a More Just Solution to the Failed International
Regulatory Regime to Protect Whales than a Trading Program in Whale Shares' (2013)
32(3) Stanford Environmental LawJournal 3-83, at p. 14.
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States. Industry states, such as Norway, have largely defected from the regime
by objecting to the moratorium and unilaterally deciding appropriate catch
quotas on the basis of interpreting data from the iwc's Scientific Committee. 12
Since 1990, the Japanese government has regularly requested for the morato-
rium to be lifted for whale stocks, such as minke whales, that are no longer
threatened or endangered. 13 Given the limited global market for whaling prod-
ucts and the strong public sentiment against commercial whaling, there has
been little inclination for the majority of the iwc States to resume discussions
on commercial whaling management.
The divisions in the treaty regime have become particularly pronounced
in the debates within the iwc's Scientific Committee to develop a Revised
Management Scheme (RMS) to implement a 1994 Revised Management
Procedure (RMP) to set future quotas for whale harvests. With respect to the
RMS, whaling States argue that the existing practices within the iwc are suf-
ficient to ensure that the RMP quotas will be respected.' 4 Whale preservation
States argue for the need to have independent monitoring and inspection of
whaling activities.15 Increasingly, the gaps have been widening between States
that are willing to trust the existing institution of the iwc to protect sovereign
interests and States that seek institutional reform.
Relations between whaling industry States and whale preservation States
became increasingly fractious when whale preservation States repeatedly sin-
gled out Japan's scientific whaling program as problematic. In 2003, the iwc
majority passed a recommendation for Japan's scientific whaling program
12 The Norwegian Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, Norwegian Whaling-Based
on a Balanced Ecosystem (March 19, 2013). Available at http://www.fisheries.no/ecosys-
tems-and-stocks/marinestocks/mammals/whales/whaling/#.Vb kGN59 7dk; accessed i
August 2015. (Observing that "Even though the work of the [International Whaling]
Commission has not been constructive, the work in the iwc's Scientific Committee has
been of considerable importance in respect of the resumption of Norwegian whaling
operations".)
13 R Smith, Japan's International Fisheries Policy: Law, Diplomacy and Politics Governing
Resource Security (Routledge, Abingdon, 2014) 140; for a detailed explanation of the
Japanese choice not to oppose the commercial moratorium, please refer to A Ishii
and A Okubo, 'An Alternative Explanation of Japan's Whaling Diplomacy in the Post-
Moratorium Era' (2007) 1o Journal of International Wildhfe Law and Polcy 55-87, at
pp. 58-61.
14 Clapham and Baker (n. 5).
15 iwc, 'Revised Management Scheme: Information on the Background and Progress of the
Revised Management Scheme (RMS).' Available at https://iwc.int/index.php?clD=rmp;
accessed 18 March 2015.
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JARPA to end unless it ceased using lethal methods for scientific research. The
iwc's Scientific Committee was expected to review the existing JARPA pro-
grams and provide advice about the output of these efforts. In 2005, the iwc
majority again passed a resolution to requestJapan to "withdraw" its JARPA II
proposal or revise it to eliminate the lethal take components. Finally, in 2007,
the iwc majority called upon Japan to "suspend indefinitely the lethal aspects
of JARPA II in the Southern Ocean Whale Sanctuary".' 6 All of this was to no
avail, as the Japanese government continued to justify its scientific whaling
fleet efforts as essential for understanding how to set appropriate RMPS in
order to eventually revive a sustainable commercial whale harvest.
The iwc itself has recognized that it faces core institutional legitimacy ques-
tions. In 2008, the iwc established a working group on "The Future of the iwc"
to examine institutional reforms, including the issuance of research permits
under Article viII of the ICRw. By 201o, all that the group was able to agree on
regarding scientific permits was that "Proposals will be developed to address
these issues for consideration during the initial five years of the arrangement". 7
Ultimately, the working group failed to agree on any reforms for the future.
Instead, the iwc appears to be trapped in an institutional limbo, unable to
assert itself as the international authoritative body to "ensure proper and effec-
tive conservation and development of whale stocks".'8
Whaling in the Antarctic: Further Fracturing of the ICRW Treaty
Regime
While the iwc struggled to reform itself and improve its institutional legiti-
macy, Australia filed an application before the Icy alleging that Japan was in
violation of its IcRw obligations under Article viII to conduct a program "for
purposes of scientific research", of paragraph lo(e) of the Schedule to observe in
good faith the zero catch limit for commercial whaling, and of paragraph 7(b)
of the Schedule to act in good faith to refrain from undertaking commercial
16 iwc, 'Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2003, 55 th Annual
Meeting, 2003, Resolution 2003-2, Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit'; Iwc,
'Resolution 2005-1, Resolution on JARPA II'; IWC, 'Resolution 2007-1, Resolution on
JARPA.' Available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/themes.php; accessed 18 March 2015.
17 iwc,'Chair's Report to the Small Working Group on the Future of Iwc', IWC/M1o/SWG 4.
Available at https://iwc.int/private/downloads/2kakjo6ab44k88sk4c84wwkok/iwc-mio-
swg4.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015.
18 ICRW (n. 2).
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whaling of humpback and fin whales in the Southern Ocean Sanctuary.19
Australia filed its application as a signal of its frustration with the failure of
bilateral diplomacy to resolve the dispute and the inadequacy of the twc to
respond appropriately to what Australia claimed to be treaty violations. 20
The Icj case is interesting because it involves interpretation not of the core
principles of the ICRW, but rather of the secondary obligations of the treaty
regarding scientific permits. Japan's decision not to oppose the commercial
whaling moratorium in 1982 is the origin of the icj conflict. After the mora-
torium was adopted as an amendment to the Schedule, States had the option
under Article v(3) of the IcRw to objectwithin 90 days to the moratorium; any
objection would prevent the moratorium from going into effect for an addi-
tional go days for all States. For those States that had not originally objected to
the moratorium, but chose to submit an objection during the second 90-day
period, the moratorium would not become effective. The us threatened, how-
ever, to apply the Pelly Amendment against States that intended to object to
the moratorium. If the us Secretary of Commerce took action under the Pelly
Amendment, this might have prevented products from States such as Norway,
Japan, and Iceland from being imported into the us. 2 1 Whereas Norway
objected to the moratorium and announced that it would be resuming com-
mercial whaling in 1993,22 Japan never entered an objection to the moratorium
because of concerns over us fisheries sanctions on Japanese exports.2 3 Japan
had the opportunity, like Norway and Iceland, to exercise its sovereign rights
ig Application Instituting Proceedings, Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan: New
Zealand intervening), 2010 I.C.J.148, atparas.36-37 (31May 2010) Available at http://www
.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/1595i.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015.
20 Australia appointed a Special Envoy on Whale Conservation to work with the Japanese
government on addressing Australia's concerns about the Article viii process in Japan.
Ibid., at para. 33.
21 22 usc 1978 ("When the Secretary of Commerce determines that nationals of a foreign
country, directly or indirectly, are conducting fishing operations in a manner or under
circumstances which diminish the effectiveness of an international fishery conserva-
tion program, the Secretary of Commerce shall certify such fact to the President... the
President may direct the Secretary of the Treasury to prohibit the bringing or the importa-
tion into the United States of any products from the offending country for any duration
as the President determines appropriate and to the extent that such prohibition is sanc-
tioned by the World Trade Organization or the multilateral trade agreements".).
22 D Caron, 'The International Whaling Commission and the North Atlantic Marine
Mammal Commission: The Institutional Risks of Coercion in Consensual Structures'
(1995) 89 American journal ofInternational Law 154-174, at p. 161.
23 Smith (n. 13), at p.139.
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to refuse the moratorium under Article v(3) of the ICRW, but instead sought to
assert its sovereign interests in a lateral fashion under Article viii.
Starting in 1987, Japan decided to operate a whaling fleet affiliated with the
Institute for Cetacean Research, using Article VIII scientific research excep-
tion permits obtained from the Japanese Government. Article viii of the ic w
provides that:
any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special
permit authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for pur-
poses of scientific research subject to such restrictions as to number and
subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks
fit, and the killing, taking and treating of whales in accordance with
the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of this
Convention.
The original Article VIII language was negotiated at a time when it was notpos-
sible for States to conduct non-lethal scientific investigation in order to under-
stand the life histories of whales. In the 1940s and 1950s, at the introduction of
the ICRw, the quality of global whale data was poor. The Article viii language
encouraged individual States to unilaterally collect research data for purposes
of supporting their national whaling industry that could then be shared to
assist the iwc in setting appropriate Maximum Sustainable Yield levels that
would support a viable global industry. The language was never intended to
allow unilateral commercial whaling by ICRW parties.
After the 1982 moratorium, Japan initiated JARPA I as its first large scien-
tific whaling research program from 1987 until 2005. The research program
was designed to understand what biological parameters affected "stock man-
agement of the Southern Hemisphere minke whale" in order to understand
the "stock structure", what role whales played in the Antarctic ecosystem, and
what effect environmental changes were having on the whales' population.25
A similar program was launched between 1994 and 1999 in the North Pacific
to determine the feeding practices of minke whales and the "stock structures"
of two groups of minke whales.2 6 Although the JARPA II program, which was
created in 2005, was designed to continue research on the questions posed
24 ICRw (n. 2) (emphasis added).
25 The Institute of Cetacean Research, 'JARPA/JARPA II research results.' Available at http://
www.icrwhale.org/JARPAResults.html; accessed 18 March 2015.
26 Ibid.
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in JARPA, 2 7 the JARPA II program was required to cease operations in 2014
in response to the Icj's decision in Whaling in the Antarctic. The Japanese
Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the North Pacific, Phase iI
(JARPN II) program was not affected by the icj decision and continued with a
focus on feeding ecology, bioaccumulation of pollutants in whales, and stock
structure studies for the common minke whale, Bryde's whale, sei whale, and
sperm whales. 28 Under all of its research programs, Japan sold for consump-
tion meat from the whales that it caught and used the profits to support the
Institute for Cetacean Research.29 Between its Antarctic and North Pacific pro-
grams, Japan has taken approximately 14,600 reported whales, which is seven
times the number of whales taken by all other nations under Article viII per-
mits since 1952.30
AfterJapan commenced JARPA II in 2005, many iwc countries, particularly
Australia, the United States and New Zealand, filed repeated resolutions stat-
ing thatJARPA ii was either outside the scope of Article viii or a bad faith use
of the exception.31 In 2008, an Australian Federal Court ordered a Japanese
whaling company to stop killing, injuring, or taking any Antarctic whales in
the Australian Whale Sanctuary, but the judgment was unenforceable because
Australia's maritime boundary claims in the Southern Ocean are contested.32
In 2oo, Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd warned Japan to end whaling or
face legal action.33 In the 62nd meeting of the iwc, the Proposed Consensus
Decision was presented which sought a compromise betweenJapan and States
who questionedJapan's use of the scientific exception by allowingJapan to har-
vest a small number of whales while ending the scientific purpose exception
27 Government of Japan, 'Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research
Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II)-Monitoring of the Antarctic
Ecosystem and Development of New Management Objectives for Whale Resources.'
Available at http://www.icrwhale.org/eng/SC5701.pdf, accessed 18 March 2015 [herein-
after 'JARPA II Plan'].
28 Ibid., at p. 6.
29 M Park, 'Japanese Scientific Whaling in Antarctica: Is Australia Attempting the
Impossible?' (2011) 9 New Zealand Journal of Public and International Law 193-221, at
p. 196; the Institute for Cetacean Research is a nonprofit research organization that is
subsidized by the Japanese government.
30 PJ Clapham, 'Japan's Whaling Following the International Court of Justice Ruling: Brave
New World-Or Business as Usual?' (2015) 51 Marine Policy 238-241, at P. 239, fn. 2.
31 iwc (n. 17).
32 Humane SocyInt'lInc. v. Kyodo SenpakuKaisha Ltd. (2008) FCR 3, para. 55 (Austl.).
33 J McCurry, 'Australia Threatens Legal Action over Japanese Whaling, The Guardian,
19 February 2010, at 27.
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and bringing all whaling under the iwc's regulatory authority.34 The consensus
was never adopted.3 5
Australia questioned the increasing post-moratorium trends in Japanese
whaling. IfJapan was indeed pursuing the various research ends that it articu-
lated inJARPA II, did Japan need to employ lethal methods to collect data on
whaling stocks and marine ecosystems or was JARPA II essentially the equiva-
lent of a commercial whaling program because itwas notjustified "for purposes
of scientific research"? Could the pursuit of science explain why underJARPA
ii Japan assigned itself an annual quota of 850 minke whales, 50 humpback
whales and 50 fin whales whenJapan's previous research efforts had only taken
840 whales in the Antarctic over the course of almost three decades? 36 Was
Japan hoodwinking all of the nations that had voted for the moratorium and
exacerbating the institutional problems that already existed before the mora-
torium was approved? Or was Japan making a good faith effort to understand
how to revive a commercial whaling industry in light of changed environmen-
tal conditions? The answers to these questions were politically charged.
In light of the known and active fissures between pro-preservation and pro-
whaling States and the inability to even reach a temporary consensus within
the treaty bodies on how to move past the current impasse, the icj faced a
difficult task. It could not end scientific whaling wholesale in spite of potential
abuses, such as conducting small-scale commercial whaling under the guise
of scientific whaling permits. The icJ, however, by rejecting JARPA II on the
basis of several reasonableness factors, assumed the role of a temporary proxy
offering its decision-making in lieu of already fractured ICRW institutions. The
IGJ judges were acutely aware of the fragile condition of the Icnw institutions
at the time that they were deliberating. Judge Keith opened his declaration
with a six-paragraph description of the context of the case, where he specifi-
cally pointed out that the membership of the ICRw has changed over the last
30 years, leading to disagreements that have led to the Commission becoming
"deadlocked" and now meeting "only every second year".37
34 iwc, 'Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales from the
Chair and Vice-Chair of the Commission, Iwc/62/7rev (28 April 2010) Available at http://
opc.ca.gov/webmaster/ftp/pdf/agenda-items/2o0oo616/Iwc%2oProposal%20(2).pdf
accessed 18 March 2015.
35 'Flexibility Needed on Whaling Issue,' The Japan Times, 8 July 2010. Available at http://
www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2010/07/08/editorials/flexibility-needed-on-whaling-
issue/#.UjPnUsbIZOw; accessed 18 March 2015.
36 JAR PA II Plan (n. 27), at pp. 18-19.
37 Whalin9 in the Antarctic, Declaration of Judge Keith (n. 1) at para. 5, p. 2. Available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/148/18142.pdf; accessed 18 March 2015.
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Beyond simply interpreting the meaning of the Article viII disputed phrase
"for the purposes of scientific research", the icj chose to assume an active man-
agerial role in the Whaling in the Antarctic case. Specifically, the icj indicated
that it would "apply" its interpretation of Article viii to "enquire into whether,
based on the evidence, the design and implementation OfJARPA II are reason-
able in relation to achieving its stated objectives".38 The Icj agreed with Japan
that "JARPA ii activities involving the lethal sampling of whales can broadly be
characterized as 'scientific research'".39
What happens next in the opinion is perhaps more surprising. The icj
assigned itself the task to "examine whether the design and implementation
of JARPA ii are reasonable in relation to achieving the programme's stated
research objectives".40 The icj does not conclude its decisions after it has inter-
preted Article viii and then request that the iwc or the Scientific Committee,
in particular, determine whether the elements OfJARPA II could be considered
reasonable "for purposes of scientific research". The icj seemed to mistrust on
some level the objectivity of the Scientific Committee's work and was reluc-
tant, at least for the Whaling in the Antarctic case, to yield decision-making
back to institutions that it might consider functionally problematic. When the
icj described its review process as including steps to determine "whether, in
the use of lethal methods the programme's design and implementation are
reasonable in relation to achieving its stated objective", the Court also empha-
sized "this standard of review is an objective one".41 In describing the Scientific
Committee's work in connection with the JARPA II plan, the icj tersely
observed: "Following review of the JARPA ii Research Plan by the Scientific
Committee, Japan granted the first set of annual special permits for JARPA II
in November 2005, after which JARPA ii became operational". It is a curious
element that there is no further commentary or reference at this point in the
opinion to any of the content of the Scientific Committee's review work on
JARPA II in 2005. This purely descriptive sentence, when read in light of the
icj's emphasis on underscoring its objective review, might be interpreted to
reflect an effort by the icy to indirectly comment on the current capacity of the
Scientific Committee to conduct an objective review.
This reading is further reinforced when the icj does discuss the role of the
Scientific Committee within the treaty regime. The icJ understood the exist-
ing challenges of a fractured Scientific Committee and directly addressed
38 Whaling in the Antarctic, Judgment (n. 1) at para. 98, p. 35.
39 Ibid., at para. 127, p. 41.
40 Ibid., at para. 127, p. 42.
41 Ibid., at para. 67, p. 29.
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these challenges in the portion of the opinion addressing whether Japan
had complied with certain procedural aspects of providing permits under
Article viII. Australia alleged that Japan failed to provide the Scientific
Committee with copies of the Article VIII permits prior to the commencement
Of JARPA II and that the permits that were provided did not contain necessary
information. Although the icj was persuaded that Japan had complied with
these procedural components, the cj provided two additional comments hint-
ing at discord within the Scientific Committee. First, the icj observed that the
procedural requirements in the Schedule and Guidelines "must be appreciated
in light of the duty of co-operation with the iwc and its Scientific Committee
that is incumbent upon all States parties to the Convention".42 Second, the icj
suggested that cooperation may not be as forthcoming as could be desired,
because "63 Scientific Committee participants" of approximately 200 members
"declined to take part in the 2005 review of the JARPA II Research Plan," but
instead "submitted a separate set of comments on the JARPA II Research Plan,
which were critical of its stated objectives and methodology".43
Even though the majority of the icj did not remand the questions of review
Of JARPA Ii back to the ICRW institutions and decided instead to examine the
design and implementation Of JARPA II itself, at least one dissenter aptly sug-
gests that the majority may have taken on more than simply treaty interpreta-
tion. Judge Yusuf commented that it is not "the task of the icj to review and
evaluate the design and implementation of a research plan for scientific whal-
ing" because "[t]hat is the function of the Scientific Committee".44 Ultimately,
the Icj decided that JARPA II's design and implementation were not reason-
able in relation to the scientific program. Specifically regarding the design of
JARPA II, the IcJ questioned whether Japan had given sufficient consider-
ation to incorporating non-lethal methods of research when there had been
42 Ibid., at para. 240, p. 69.
43 Ibid., at para. 241, p. 69.
44 Whaling in the Antarctic, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Yusuf (n. 1) at para. 4. p. 1; see also
ibid., at para. 17, p. 4, and at para. 61, p. 16 ('It is a pity that... the Court has engaged in
an evaluation of the design and implementation of the programme [JARPA II] and their
reasonableness in relation to its objectives, a task that normally falls within the compe-
tence of the Scientific Committee of the iwc ... As a matter of fact, when the Scientific
Committee took the view in the past that a permit proposal submitted by a State did
not meet its criteria, it specifically recommended that the permits sought should not be
issued. This has not been the case with regard to JARPA II, but it shows at least that the
Committee's practice is adequate to the task of evaluating the design and implementa-
tion of scientific research programmes under the ICRw and accordingly advising the iwc
on that matter".).
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substantial developments in non-lethal research techniques. 45 In relation to
the implementation of JARPA ii, the icj expressed concern that the annual
lethal sample sizes were not re-evaluated in light of the gap between the
research plan's proposed target sample size and the actual take.46 The icj ulti-
mately concluded that JAR PA II lacked sufficient evidence to support a nexus
between its articulated research objectives and the numbers of whales that
might be taken under the research permits issued by Japan.47
Although the icj appropriately did not weigh in on matters of scientific
dispute, it did assume an active role in deciding questions regarding the
"reasonableness" ofJARPA II under the ICRW. Reflecting the current level of
institutional dysfunction within the ICRW framework, the icy majority chose
to assert its judicial authority as a temporary truce-maker between Japan,
as a pro-whaling State, and Australia and New Zealand, as pro-preservation
States, by making relatively specific decisions about the "reasonableness" of
JARPA ii as a scientific research program. On many levels, this should have
been the work of the Scientific Committee working in close cooperation with
the Commission. Judge Sebutinde, Judge Cancado Trindade, Judge Bhandari,
and Judge ad hoc Charlesworth recognized in their separate opinions the need
for the Committee to review and comment on special permits and for States to
carefully consider the input of the Committee.48
Several icJ judges opined that the Scientific Committee needed to play
a significant role in legitimizing the activities of the ICnw regime as part of a
larger conversation between science and law. These Judges disagreed with the
majority's analysis of Paragraph 30 of the Schedule, because the majority lim-
ited Paragraph 30 to a purely formal procedural obligation.4 9 Judge Bhandari
argued that the requirement to submit special permits for review and com-
ment by the Scientific Committee obliged Japan to engage in a "proper dia-
logue with the Committee concerning the scientific output ofJARPA with the
aim of possibly revising JARPA II prior to its launch".50 Judge Bhandari's views
45 Whaling in the Antarctic, Judgment (n. 1) at para. 137, p. 43.
46 Ibid., at para. 156, p.4 8 .
47 Ibid., at paras. 195-198, PP. 57-58.
48 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n. 1) at para. 19, P. 5;
Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade (n. 1) at para. 17,
p. 6.; Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n. i) at para. 1o, p. 3.;
Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge AdHoc Charlesworth (n. 1) at para. 5,
pp. 1-2.
49 See, e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n. 1) at para. 15,
PP. 3-4.
50 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n. 1) at para. io, p. 3.
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are echoed by Judge ad hoc Charlesworth, who indicated that there is an affir-
mative obligation "on the proposing State to co-operate with the Committee,"
which means providing the iwc with permits before issuance so that the
Scientific Committee can review and comment on them, providing "specified
information" about the permits, engaging the participation of the international
scientific community in the research, and giving "consideration in good faith
to the views of the iwc and the Scientific Committee".5 Although the findings
of the Committee do not need to be accepted by the State requesting scientific
permit review, the State "must show genuine willingness to reconsider its posi-
tion in light of [the Committee's] views".5 2 Particularly troubling for several of
the judges was the lack of assessment of JARPA before Japan issued permits
underJARPA II that were "virtual replicas" of the JARPA permits.53 The Judges
expressed concern that the review process before the Committee, which they
understood as being integral to the operation of the ICRW, was being treated
as an "unacceptable 'rubber stamp' mechanism" in violation of a duty to co-
operate that is "a broad and purposive obligation that entails an on-going
dialogue with the Scientific Committee".54 The question after Whaling in the
Antarctic is whether the Committee will be able to contribute meaningfully to
discussions regarding the future of whales and whaling or whether the efforts
of the Committee to promote scientific methodology will be hijacked by
national politics.
Renegotiating Faultlines: Proposals for Annex viii Reform
At the iwc's meeting in September 2014 after the icj decision, Parties adopted
a Resolution on whaling under special permit which included the request
that States not issue further permits until (i) the Scientific Committee had an
opportunity to provide advice on "reasonableness" and (2) the Commission
could review an Scientific Committee report to make such recommendations
51 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Charlesworth (n. 1) at
paras. 14-15, PP. 4-5.
52 Ibid., at paras. 15, pp. 4-5.
53 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Sebutinde (n. 1), at para. 17, p. 4;
Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n. i), at para. 18, p. 5.
54 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade (n. i) at para. 19,
p. 6; Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion ofJudge Bhandari (n. 1) at para. 9, pp. 2-3
and at para. u, p. 3.
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"as it sees fit".55 The Resolution identified the icj opinion and noted that the
opinion presented an authoritative interpretation of Article viII. Specifically,
the Resolution recalled that the "Court established several parameters for a
programme for purposes of scientific research" that the iwc should consider
when reviewing special permits.56 The iwc made note of certain elements
that it might review, including "the scale of the programme's use of lethal sam-
pling, the methodology used to select sample sizes, a comparison of the target
sample sizes and the actual take, the timeframe associated with a programme,
the programme's scientific output, and the degree to which a programme coor-
dinates its activities with related research projects".57 It is significant that the
vote on the Resolution was not a consensus vote, but ended with 35 parties in
favour, 25 against, and 5 abstentions.58 The vote on the Resolution reflected the
differences between whaling industry revival States and preservation States.
In light of both the Icj's decision and the Resolution, it is clear that a subset
of ICRw members expect both more objective engagement by the Scientific
Committee as it reviews scientific permits and programs and more "mean-
ingful" on-going cooperation between States and the Scientific Committee.
Existing icRw documents contemplate an active Scientific Committee. For
example, the iwc Rules of Procedure provide that "The Scientific Committee
shall review the current scientific and statistical information with respect
to whales and whaling, shall review current scientific research programmes
of Governments, other international organisations or of private organisa-
tions, shall review the scientific permits and scientific programmes for which
Contracting Governments plan to issue scientific permits, shall review cur-
rent and potential threats and methods to mitigate them in order to maintain
cetacean populations at viable levels, shall provide conservation and manage-
ment advice where appropriate, shall consider such additional matters as may
be referred to it by the Commission or by the Chair of the Commission, and
shall submit reports and recommendations to the Commission".59 This is an
active and full agenda for a body that is underfunded and relies on voluntary
scientific advice from either national delegates who are funded by their State
55 iwc, 'Resolutions Adopted at the 65 th Meeting: Resolution 2014-5, Resolution on
Whaling under Special Permits, Sec. 3. Available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/search
.php?search=%21collection72&k=; accessed iJune 2015.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 iwc, 'Chair's Report of the 65 th Meeting' (2014), P. 17, para. 151. Available at https://archive
.iwc.int/pages/search.php?search=!collection49&bcjfrom=themes; accessed 1June 2015.
59 iwc, Rules ofProcedure ofthe International Whaling Commission 2074, Section M.4(a), p. 7.
Available at https://archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=; accessed 18 March 2015.
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or invited participants who may or may not receive funding from a State or
from the Iwc.6 0
Existing ICRw documents contemplate a deeper level of cooperation with
the Scientific Committee from those States seeking to take whales for pur-
poses of scientific research. The iwc's Rules of Procedure provide that coun-
tries intending to operate research programs requiring permitting under
Article viii should provide to the Scientific Committee "specifics as to the
objectives of the research, number, sex, size, and stock of the animals to be
taken, opportunities for participation in the research by scientists of other
nations, and the possible effect on conservation of the stock resulting from
granting the permits".6 ' The Committee should review and comment on these
data in light of existing biological and ecological knowledge.
But can the Scientific Committee as an institution satisfy the compet-
ing interests of sufficient member States to be considered an effective treaty
institution? In practice, the Scientific Committee reports since the inception
of JARPA II have reflected repeated problems in reviewing ICRW Article viII
permit proposals. 62 In 2005, for example, during the review process OfJARPA II
permits, the Committee commented that "the Committee recognises the
chronic difficulties it faces in separating purely scientific issues from those
issues that are more appropriate for discussion in other fora and notably
the Commission" 63 In 2006, the Committee noted that "it has difficulties in
reviewing scientific permit proposals" because it was not possible for "a large
Working Group of the Committee... to efficiently review complex docu-
ments such as the recent special permit proposals"."4 In 2007, the Committee
6o iwc, Scientific Committee Handbook. Available at https://iwc.int/scientific-committee-
handbook; accessed 18 March 2015 (Noting that "funding for invited participants will
be provided if available" (emphasis in original); noting further that the research budget
approved by the Commission to support the efforts of the Scientific Committee for 2012-
2013 was E314,984).
61 iwc, Rules of Procedure of the Scientific Committee, Section F, p. 24. Available at https://
archive.iwc.int/pages/view.php?ref=3605&k=; accessed 18 March 2015.
62 For purposes of this article, each Summary Report of the Scientific Committee from the
start OfJARPA II in 2005 to its conclusion in 2014 was reviewed for observations about the
review of proposed special permits to be issued under Article viii.
63 IWC, '2005 Report of the Scientific Committee' (2006) 8 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean
Research and Management 1-65, at p. 52 (Sec. 16.2. Review of new or continuing propos-
als, 16.2.1. JARPA II).
64 IwC, '2006 Report of the Scientific Committee' (2007) 9 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean
Research and Management 1-73, at pp. 57-58 (Sec. 16.. Improving the Committee's proce-
dure for reviewing scientific permit proposals).
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commented again that "the process for reviewing the special permits is less
than satisfactory".65 The Committee opined that scientists from a Government
who was requesting review of a special permit who were participating in a spe-
cial permit review should not participate in the drafting of the "findings and
recommendations," which should "only reflect the opinions of the indepen-
dent experts".66
Institutional problems were flagged again in 2010 when the Scientific
Committee observed that an expert panel responsible for reviewing proposed
scientific research permits to be issued under JARPA II may have had conflicts
of interest. According to the report, five members, representing about half of
the members of the expert panel, had either published using data obtained
under JARPA or were a scientist directly associated with the program. 67 Four
of the ten members apparently had played important roles in earlier reviews
of special permits forJapan.68 Members of the Scientific Committee were split
about the need for members of an expert panel to submit conflict-of-interest
statements before reviewing proposals to issue scientific permits.69 Adding to
the challenges of creating an independent panel, the 2010 Scientific Committee
report also suggested that Parties, such asJapan, seeking review of special per-
mits are not providing review panels with sufficient information before the
requested review.70
In 2012 and 2013, it was unclear whether any special permits that Japan
intended to issue under JARPA II were ever reviewed by the Scientific
Committee. In 2013, the only note in the Scientific Committee report under
review of new "proposals" indicated that "Japan reported that there was no plan
to change the JARPA II programme".'7 Although reviews of any special permits
for these seasons may appear in subsidiary documentation, it is surprising that
65 iwc, '2007 Report of the Scientific Committee' (2008) 10 (SUPPL.)journal of Cetacean
Research andManagementl-74, at p. 6o (Sec. 17.4. Improving the Committee's procedures
for reviewing scientific permit proposals and research results).
66 Ibid., at pp. 6o-6i.
67 Iwc, '2oo9 Report of the Scientific Committee' (2010) 11 (SUPPL. 2)Journal of Cetacean
Research and Management 1-98, at pp. 78-79 (Sec. 17.6. Evaluate the performance of the
agreed procedure for reviewing scientific permit proposals, and periodic and final review
of results from scientific permit research).
68 Ibid., at p. 79.
69 Ibid.
70 Ibid.
71 Iwc, '2013 Report of the Scientific Committee' (2014) 15 (SUPPL.) Journal of Cetacean
Research and Management 1-75, at p. 61 (Sec. 17.5. Review of new or continuing proposals,
17.5.1. JARPA II).
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there is no mention of permits, given that the Scientific Committee is expected
to review proposals for scientific permits before they are issued by an ICRW
party and permits were presumably issued for the 2013-2014 whaling season.
In 2014, Japan prepared a new proposal for Antarctic whaling to be vetted
under a process that included review "by a small specialist workshop with a
limited but adequate number of invited experts," followed by a submission
of a report to the Scientific Committee as a whole.72 According to the 2014
Scientific Committee report, the Government of Japan would underwrite the
costs of the specialist workshop to be held in Tokyo,Japan. These comments by
the Scientific Committee regarding this Japan-based review process were not
endorsed by "scientists from countries that made a statement at plenary that it
was inappropriate for the sc (Scientific Committee) to continue the review of
the JARPA II programme" and therefore "did not participate in the discussion
related tO JARPA II agenda items".7 3
The new Proposed Research Plan forNew Scientific Whale Research Program
in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) is a relatively short proposal of 42 pages,
accompanied by 13 annexes. 74 In NEWREP-A, the Japanese government took
the opportunity to highlight the portions of the icj decision that it deemed to
be significant, including the conclusion that (i) whales taken under Article viii
are not subject to the iwc Schedule; (2) the object and purpose of the treaty
includes "sustainable exploitation"; (3) the Guidelines for research include not
just research on whales but also research on "hypotheses not directly related to
the management of living marine resources"; (4) the State authorizing special
permits has an obligation to offer an "objective basis" for the lethal takes; and
(5) lethal sampling "per se" was "not unreasonable in relation to the research
objectives of JARPA ii". The NEWREP-A document set out to address the spe-
cific inadequacies of the JARPA II program identified by the IcJ with a particu-
lar focus on providing a justification for lethal methods and evidence for the
size of the lethal sampling set.75 On the issue of lethal takes, Japan investigated
the feasibility of using other methods besides lethal methods, including biopsy
72 IWC, '2014 Report of the Scientific Committee, Iwc/65/Repoi(2014), og/o6/2014, at p. 74
(Sec. 17.4.2. Planning for review of future Japanese Special Permit research in Antarctic).
73 Ibid., atp. 68 (Sec. 17.1. Expert Panel Review of the results fromJARPA II).
74 'Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic
Ocean', available at maff.go.jp/j/whale/pdf/newrep--a.pdf, accessed 1o September 2015.
75 Ibid., at pp. 6-7. The Japanese government also identified other issues raised by the icj
decision including methodology for selecting whales that would be taken, the open-
ended time frame of the scientific programme, the limited scientific output of the pro-
gramme to date, and the lack of cooperation with other whale research efforts.
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sampling, satellite tagging, data-logger use, and biomarkers.76Japan concludes
that these alternatives are not feasible for measuring "age at sexual maturity,"
which Japan asserts is necessary for setting a maximum sustainable yield ratio
and for measuring prey consumption; therefore lethal take methods are nec-
essary in order to obtain earplugs and enable dissection of internal organs.77
Regarding lethal sample sizes, Japan indicates in its proposed research plan
that the numbers it has picked are largely based on collective "age at sexual
maturity" data, but that these sizes may need to be revised.78
To address squarely the issue thatJapan defacto is participating in commer-
cial whaling through its distribution of special permits under the research pro-
posal, Japan notes that "Japan has therefore announced that it confirmed its
basic policy of pursuing the resumption of commercial whaling, and collecting
and analysing necessary data through special permit whaling for this purpose,
in full accordance with legal requirements including the IC RW, its paragraphio(e)
of the Schedule which establishes the moratorium on commercial whaling, as
well as in light of the Icj Judgment".79 Japan is unequivocal that results from
NEWREP-A are intended to end the twenty-year moratorium.80 With Japan's
intention to issue special permits as an initial step towards resuming whaling,
Japan identifies NEWREP-A as offering "an objective basis" for justifying lethal
research under Article viii. 81 In keeping with its conciliatory stance on fol-
lowing institutional processes, the document further indicated that Japan is
amenable to feedback from other States and institutions about the proposal.82
Japan specifically stated that "After the iwc sc will 'review and comment' on
this proposed plan, those comments will be given due regard and the proposed
plan will be revised, if necessary, taking account of them".83
What happened next reveals the increasing fragility of the iwc as an insti-
tution capable of handling both the conservation of whales and the sustain-
able use of whales as commercial resources. In April 2015, Japan submitted
NEWREP-A for the review of a ten-person expert panel. Some members of the
iwc's expert panel questioned to what degree the NEWREP-a differed in its
76 Ibid., at p. 8.
77 Ibid., at p. 9.
78 Ibid.
79 Ibid., atp. n1.
8o The moratorium was adopted in 1982 but applied to the 1985/1986 season.
81 NEWREP-A (n. 74), at P.7.
82 Ibid ("Japan always welcomes comments from outside that are based upon scientific con-
sideration to which it will give due regard".)
83 Ibid., at n.
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objectives from JARPA/JARPA ii and requested that additional data be sup-
plied to determine whether lethal sampling was necessary for whale stock
management and conservation. 84 The panel further recommended that a
series of panel recommendations, many of which included collecting addi-
tional information over the course of 1-3 field seasons, "should be completed
and the results evaluated before there is a final conclusion on lethal techniques
and sample sizes".85 Additional questions were raised by scientists observing
the expert panel. 6 There were dissenting voices among scientists observing
the panel.8 7Japan submitted some additional data.88 But inJune 2015, the iwc
Scientific Committee indicated, based on the Expert Panel report, that it still
did not have adequate information to determine whether lethal sampling was
necessary.89 They requested that Japan reply to the Panel's recommendations
and stated that progress would be reviewed in 2016.90 The Scientific Committee
did endorse the deployment by Japan of vessels for biopsy sampling and satel-
lite tagging of whales.9 1 The report and the Scientific Committee meeting itself
84 Report of the expert panel to review the proposal by Japan for NEWREP-A, 7-10 February,
2015, Tokyo, Japan, sc/66a/Rep6 (2015): 2 ("In summary, with the information presented
in the proposal, the Panel noted that it was not able to determine whether lethal sampling
is necessary to achieve the two major objectives; therefore, it concluded that the current
proposal did not demonstrate the need for lethal sampling to achieve those objectives".).
85 Ibid
86 P. Wade, 'Brief Review of Whether Lethal Methods are Required for NEWREP-A', SC/F15/
sPo6 (2015); P. Wade, 'What is the Best Way to Age Antarctic Minke Whales?' sc/F13/SP05
(2015).
87 See, e.g., T Gunnlaugsson and GA Vikingsson, 'Comments on the Proposed Research
Plan for New Scientific Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A),
submitted to the Scientific Committee of the iwc by the Government of Japan, sc/F15/
SP04 (2015) (finding that "the new research program, together with the data collected dur-
ing JARPA and JARPAII, will constitute a unique data series on the Antarctic ecosystem
that will have a great value for the future, e.g., for studies on climate change"); L. Pastene
etal., 'A Response to "sC/F15/sPo3, sc/F15/sP11 (2015); T Kitakado, 'A Response to "SC/FI5/
SP02"', SC-F15-SPo9 (2015); T Tamura and K Konishi, 'A Response to Document sC/FI5I
sPol "Comments on proposed research plan for new scientific whale research program in
the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A) with regard to feeding ecology objectives" by R Leaper
and BA Roel', sC-15-sPo8 (2015).
88 Government of Japan, 'Addendum to the Proposed Research Plan for New Scientific
Whale Research Program in the Antarctic Ocean (NEWREP-A), sc/66a/sP2 (2015).
89 IWC, '2015 Report of the Scientific Committee, Iwc/66/Repol(2o15) (June 9, 2015): 96.
go Ibid
91 Ibid., at p. 52.
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continued to reflect the fissure lines within the Iwc that seem to be becoming
increasingly more entrenched. 92
As of September 2015,Japan and its pro-whaling allies are in a stand-off with
pro-preservation States. Japan has stated that it may unilaterally resume whal-
ing under NEWREP-A in spite of the lack of consensus from the Committee
that the NEWREP-A program offers a reasonable scientific research design.93
This is perhaps not surprising, given pressure from certain domestic constitu-
encies. In spite of Japan's acknowledgment of the binding nature of the iwc
moratorium on commercial whaling, Japan's media have been giving undue
emphasis to the stockpiling of whale meat in Japan for what seem to be com-
mercial ventures. 94
In spite of some changes with the introduction of new review procedures
that the Committee is trying to implement,95 the status quo does not appear
to have shifted much from how scientific whaling permits have been previ-
ously reviewed under JARPA 11.96 The only existing obligation associated with
Article viii is for a Contracting Government to provide the iwc with "pro-
posed scientific permits before they are issued in sufficient time to allow
92 Ibid., at p. 93. "After initial general discussion of this item, a number of comments both
supporting NEWREP-A and opposing it were made, some addressing particular issues and
others offering broad comments on the general merits or otherwise of the lethal aspects
of the proposal, ecosystem management, interpretations of the Resolution from a proce-
dural perspective, a letteng from a group of 500 scientists from 30 countries opposing the
proposal and various comments on the judgment of the International Court of Justice.
From this discussion, it was clear that it would not be possible to develop a consensus
Committee view OfNEWREP-A.
93 'Whale Hunt To Be Resumed This Year, The Japan Times (23 June 2015) (citing Joji
Morishita, Japan's representative to the iwc, who claims that pro-preservation states are
engaging in "environmental imperialism" and regretting that "There is no definite conclu-
sion in the report itself... which is not so surprising in the iwc, because as we know very
well the iwc is a divided organization".).
94 'Japan's Whaling Hiatus Sees Meat Stocks Hit 15-year Low', The Japan Times (19 July 2015)
(indicating that "inventories at whale meat distributors with large-scale refrigeration or
freezer facilities stood at 3,027 tons at the end of August and have since continued falling",
that "Japan plans to import about i,8oo tons of whale meat from Iceland via the Arctic Sea
to cope with the declining inventories", and that there will be "tough conditions in the
near-term for wholesalers of whale meat and restaurants serving it".).
95 Iwc, '2015 Report of the Scientific Committee' (n. 88).
96 Iwc, '2014 Report of the Scientific Committee, Annex P: Process for the Review of Special
Permit Proposals and Research Results from Existing and Completed Permits, Iwc/65/
Repol(2014): Annex P, 09/06/2014.
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the Scientific Committee to review and comment on them".97 There is noth-
ing specific in either Article viii or in the Schedule to prevent a State from
ultimately issuing a special permit that the Scientific Committee may have
reservations about as long as the Committee has been given adequate oppor-
tunity to "review and comment". This gap between procedure and substance
has proven to be problematic in the review of NEWREP-A. Japan seems to be
taking the position that the Scientific Committee has had its opportunity to
review and comment on the permit and that there is no obligation for Japan
to submit any additional data, because, as the iwc's webpage states, "the iwc
does not regulate special permit whaling".98 Japan appears inJune 2015 to have
conceded to provide additional data, but not because it is obliged to do so.9 9
But should submitting proposals for scientific whaling, such as NEWREP-A, to
the iwc institutions simply be a matter of diplomatic courtesy or can the iwc
institutions help to create a more rational framework for exercising sovereign
rights over natural resources?
The same institutional problems highlighted in the 2005-2014 Scientific
Committee reports that raise questions about the ICRW's legitimacy are likely
to continue to recur in the future. If there is a general consensus, with the
exception of a few persistent objectors, that substantive independent scien-
tific review should be the foundation for the approval of these permits, as sev-
eral of the Committee's reports have suggested, then it may be time to amend
both Article viII and the IwC Schedule Paragraph 30 to empower the Scientific
Committee to issue Article viii permits on a season-by-season basis to any
State-sponsored scientific research entity that requests a permit.
Even though it may take time to achieve this substantial revision to both the
treaty and its schedule, due to political concerns over ceding sovereign inter-
ests to international institutions, these amendments are politically possible.
When the ICRW was concluded in 1949, no one would have predicted a multi-
year moratorium on commercial whaling imposed under the ICRW. Today,
the ICRw has 88 Member States.100 A decision by the Commission to amend
the treaty only requires a simple majority; a decision to change the schedule
would require a three-quarters majority vote.101 As previously noted, the vote
on the 2014 Resolution on whaling under special permits was a split vote with
97 ICRW (n. 2) at Schedule, Article 30.
98 Iwc, Special Permit Whaling, https://iwc.int/permits; accessed 15 September 2015.
99 'Whale Hunt To Be Resumed This Year, The Japan Times (n. 92).
100 iwc, https://iwc.int/home; accessed i August 2015.
101 ICRW (n. 2) at Article 111(2).
THE INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF MARINE AND COASTAL LAW 30 (2015) 700-726
721
TELESETSKY AND LEE
35 favourable votes, 25 opposed votes, and 5 abstentions. 102 Although it is
unclear how 23 other states who did not participate in the vote would have
voted on this matter, the existing voting ratio from the 2014 Resolution would
be sufficient for a Commission to decide to pursue an amendment to the
treaty. Based on the discussion involving the 2014 Resolution, at least one block
of States, the Buenos Aires Group, might even become the champions for an
amendment process for the treaty.0 3
Understandably, a decision to amend the treaty alone may not be a game
changer for States such as Japan, because Japan would be entitled to reject
any amendments to the multilateral treaty and instead continue to comply
with the original unamended treaty language.104 This is a fair critique and a
realistic potential outcome. Proceeding to amend the treaty, however, would
accurately reflect the existing intent of the majority of ICRW Parties to man-
age whale resources on the basis of data obtained from scientific research that
has been vetted with the support of an international scientific community.
The existence of an amended treaty ratified by States who support reform of
Article viii could serve as a strategic tool for some States to persuade other
States of the merits of rebuilding a long-term commercial whaling industry
based on shared data that are deemed to be highly reliable data.
These amendment proposals are practical from an institutional perspective
and should be regarded by States as achieving "good faith" implementation
of the object and purpose of the ic Rw that was negotiated "to provide for the
conservation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources".105
The purpose of the scientific research permit available under Article viiI is to
allow ICRW Parties to collectively consider information about whale stocks so
that the Parties will collectively make rational management decisions regard-
ing future harvest allowances for different species in different locations. This
is why individual States have an affirmative obligation to "transmit to such
body as may be designated by the Commission, in so far as practicable, and
at intervals of not more than one year, scientific information available to that
Government with respect to whales and whaling".1 06
102 IWC 2014-5 Resolution (n. 55).
103 Ibid., at p. 16, para. 146 (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Peru and Uruguay opposed scientific whaling and recommended amendments
to the treaty so that "special permits cannot be issued unilaterally".).
104 Vienna Convention on Law of Treaties, (22 May 1969, in force 27January 1980) n55 U.N. T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679, Part iv.
105 ICRW (n. 2) Article v(2).
1o6 Ibid., Article viI(3).
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Judge Sebutinde aptly points out in her separate opinion that because:
the scientific research to be conducted under such [Article VIII] per-
mits is intended for the benefit of not only the State issuing the permits
but also the International Whaling Commission and the international
whaling community as a whole... [t]he discretion afforded by Article
viii ... is necessarily limited in scope and character.107
What this suggests is that permits for scientific research currently issued by
individual States under Article VIII must function to generate credible, high-
quality data that can become the basis for collectively defining international
commercial harvest limits. Whether data will be ultimately deemed to be cred-
ible and of high quality by the iwc and the international whaling community
depends in part on the underlying substantive design of any given research
framework. The credibility of the design of a research framework is a decision
best left to whale researchers and not politicians.
Article VIII(1) permits are exceptional permits to improve collective
knowledge about whale resources in order to make institutionally educated
decisions about management. These permits are not issued as part of the
system for regulating commercial whaling where States have a direct inter-
est in exercising jurisdictional control over their nationals. Because the infor-
mation collected from scientific research permits is intended to be shared
with the Commission or a body designated by the Commission, it would be
beneficial for the Scientific Committee, the entity most likely to be working
with the data, to propose catch limits, to take a more active role in the issu-
ance of the final research permits. A proposal to amend the administration of
Article VIII permits by giving permitting authority to the Scientific Committee
attempts to both honour the object and purpose of the original treaty while
simultaneously reflecting existing concerns of a number of ICRW Parties that
Article VIII permits have not always been fully vetted by independent experts
for scientific rigor.
Although the existing language in Article VIII is highly deferential to the
power of individual States to issue permits "subject to such restrictions as to
number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government
thinks fit", this deferential position does not reflect the viewpoints of at least
35 members of the iwC who have voted more recently for a greater degree
of involvement of the Scientific Committee and the Commission in the spe-
cial permit process.108 Although there is no precedent for permits issued by
107 Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion ofJudge Sebutinde (n. 1) at para. 4, p.1.
1o8 IWC 2014-5 Resolution (n. 55).
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an international body to an individual state as part of a global administra-
tive state, the whaling regime is an appropriate framework for experimenting
with such practices, given the negotiated and widely supported moratorium
affecting a highly migratory species. 09 One question is whether the existing
treaty mechanism of authorizing individual States to unilaterally issue sci-
entific permits should be considered increasingly obsolete in light of socio-
political changes driven by the expansion of globalized communications and
fishing fleets.
A number of global conditions have changed since 1946, when States agreed
to allow individual States to issue and revoke scientific permits for "any of
its nationals;" these might now favour a new approach beyond the current
status quo based on States issuing special permits with limited review and com-
ment from the Scientific Committee. Whereas after World War II it may have
made sense for each State to issue its own scientific permits because of the
physical difficulty of coordinating information through post or wire between
an intergovernmental organization like the iwc based in England and a State
member such asJapan, these barriers no longer exist in 2015. Decisions on per-
mits can be rapidly disseminated. Reporting can be done easily through elec-
tronic means.
In addition, the current approach under Article viII that favours the nation-
state is ripe for potential abuse that would not have been as great a concern
in 1946. The language in Article viIi allows permits to be issued to "any of its
nationals". Ships have the nationality of the State whose flag they are entitled
to fly and are therefore nationals of their flag state.110 Under Article viii, a
permit could be issued to any research vessel that is entitled to fly the flag of
the State issuing the permit or to a corporate entity claiming to do "research
and development". Since World War ii, "flags of convenience" (Foc) from open
registries have become prevalent and these FOC States may unilaterally issue
research permits to "nationals" as long as they otherwise comply with the IC RW
Schedule. Requesting permits from a FOC State might be strategically pursued
by private entities who wish to whale commercially but are located primarily
1o9 This type of international permitting supported by scientific verification may also be
appropriate for other species. See generally, A Telesetsky, 'Going Once, Going Twice-
Sold to the Highest Bidder: Restoring Equity on the High Seas through Centralized High
Seas Fish Auctions, in H Scheiber and MS Kwon (eds.), Securing the Ocean for the Next
Generation (Law of the Sea Institute Publication, Berkeley, CA, 2013), https://www.law
.berkeley.edu/files/Telesetsky-final.pdf; accessed 1 October 2015 (describing the possibil-
ity of an internationally centralized mechanism of global auctions for allocating increas-
ingly rare tuna).
n1o United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay, io December 1982, in
force 16 November 1994) 1833 U.N. T.S. 396, Article 91.
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in a State supporting the existing commercial whaling moratorium. FOc States
in the context of illegal, unreported, and unregulated (iuu) fishing have noto-
riously poor enforcement records. It is worth noting that several of the more
recent parties to the ICRW who joined after the moratorium include States
that are associated with offering FOc, including Belize, Cambodia, Panama,
and Mongolia, who have been implicated in IuU fishing."' These States could
authorize research permits that would feed a market for whale meat, particu-
larly in States with increasingly limited access to protein resources.
If States are willing to support amendments to Article VIII, the Scientific
Committee could be authorized to administer a process for the issuance of
scientific permits. This process would be available for any scientific entities
requesting permits to take whales. There is no rational reason why a scientific
entity engaged in whaling research must be sponsored by a single State as the
current system provides. If the Scientific Committee through a panel of inde-
pendent experts is empowered to issue permits, rather than individual States,
this administrative process might improve the transparency and accountabil-
ity currently associated with whaling research permits. This shift in the issu-
ance of permits from national offices to international organizations may avoid
the recurring diplomatic disputes alleging that States such as Japan are engag-
ing in commercial whaling under the guise of a scientific permit 12
In order to prevent politics from undermining decision-making on the
basis of scientific findings by the Scientific Committee, States may also agree
to articulate in any amendment a legal standard whereby a scientific permit
issued by the Committee will be deemed to be valid, unless the Commission
can show by a preponderance of the evidence that the Scientific Committee is
exercising its authority arbitrarily and capriciously.
Although this proposed reform may depoliticize some aspects of Article viII
permits and provide a better framework for determining whether a given
iii iwc, 'Membership and Contracting Governments. Available at https://iwc.int/members;
accessed 18 March 2o15; See generally, M Gianni and W Simpson, The Changing Nature
of High Seas Fishing: How Flags of Convenience Provide Cover for Illega Unreported and
Unregulated Fishing (Australian Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry,
International Transport Workers' Federation, and WWF International, 2005).
112 See, e.g., Whaling in the Antarctic, Separate Opinion of Judge Bhandari (n. 1) at para. 22,
p. 6 and para. 23, p. 6 ("[A] proper reading of the Convention envisages only three exhaus-
tive and mutually exclusive purposes of whaling: (i) scientific research; (ii) commercial
enterprise; and (iii) aboriginal subsistence. It is uncontested that aboriginal subsistence
whaling is not a live issue in this case. It therefore stands to reason that a finding by this
Court that JARPA II is not a programme for purposes of scientific research necessarily
leads to the corollary that it is a commercial whaling programme".).
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scientific program has been reasonably designed and implemented as man-
dated by the icj, it will not be enough to simply reform the practices asso-
ciated with the issuance of special permits to close the existing fault lines
between pro-whaling industry States and pro-preservation States. As distaste-
ful as it may be for pro-preservation States, the ICRW is a treaty "for the con-
servation, development, and optimum utilization of the whale resources".
Although there may be different ideas about what constitutes "optimum utili-
zation of the whale resources," particularly in light of ecosystem service discus-
sions over protecting complex marine food chains and top predators, the ICRW
was negotiated in 1946 to support the "orderly development of the whaling
industry". Because it is not a preservation treaty per se but reflects instead an
early effort at sustainable development, the iwc must revisit the stalled Revised
Management Schemes to determine how some level of commercial whaling
might be resumed that would also address national food security concerns.113
If it is simply a question of when the moratorium will be lifted, rather than
whether the moratorium will be lifted, then pro-preservation States may need
to endorse an approach that does not rely on a zero-sum strategy, but perhaps
focuses instead on protecting certain key breeding or feeding areas.114
Whaling in the Antarctic puts in sharp relief the conflicts between State
parties over the current operation and the future capacity of the ICRw treaty
regime to address whales and whaling. Although States may not be able to rec-
oncile their divergent interests quickly, something will need to change insti-
tutionally at the Commission for the ICRW to be an effective conservation
and sustainable development treaty for the 21st century. A key focus for States
should be on empowering the Committee to substantively inform decision-
making to support the objectives of the ICRW. Otherwise, States can find bet-
ter uses for their limited resources than propping up a broken treaty regime
that contributes neither to long-term conservation of whales nor to potential
food security.
113 See generally, iwc, 'Report of the Revised Management Scheme Expert Drafting Group',
Iwc/54/RMS 1, 28/08/08; Iwc/65/lo Rev 4 Resolution on Food Security (Submitted by
Ghana, Cte d'Ivoire, Mali, Republic of Guinea, Benin), 18/09/14 (resolving for "Member
States to take into account the need for, inter alia, food and nutrition security, preserva-
tion of cultural identity and security of livelihoods when making proposed amendments
to the Schedule".); in 2014, the Resolution did not receive consensus at the 2014 meeting,
but it will be revisited in 2015.
114 Clapham (n. 30), at p. 241 (arguing that Japan is likely to pursue a strategy of convincing
additional developing countries and small island nations to vote to lift the iwc morato-
rium and reinstate commercial whaling).
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